COUNSELS, COUNCILS AND LUNCH:

PREVENTING ABUSE OF THE POWER TO
APPOINT INDEPENDENT COUNSELS
PETER M. RYANt
INTRODUCTION

On July 14, 1994, Judge David B. Sentelle of the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ("D.C. Circuit")
ate lunch in the Senate dining room with Republican North Carolina
Senators Lauch Faireloth and Jesse Helms. Judge Sentelle later
described the lunch as nothing more than a visit with old friends, the
discussion ranging from prostate problems to country music.' At the
time of the lunch, however, Judge Sentelle was a member of the

Court of Appeals "Division to Appoint Independent Counsels"
("Special Division"), a three-judge panel which makes such appointments pursuant to the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 ("Ethics
Act").2 The Special Division was then considering the appoint-

t BA 1987, Princeton University; M.FA 1990, New York University; J.D.
Candidate 1997, University of Pennsylvania. I would like to thank Professor Stephen
Burbank for his comments on an earlier draft and Pilar Ramos for her wonderful
editing. I would also like to thank the Miami burglars who stole an earlier draft from
the trunk of Pilar's car lastJuly. As they never sent me any comments, I assume they
thought it was okay.
'See Frank J. Murray, High Court Rejects Probe of Judge in Selection of Whitewater
Counsel WASH. TIMES, May 31, 1995, atA8. Before becoming a federal judge, Sentelle
was chairman of the Mecldenberg County Republican Party in North Carolina. He
worked on the election campaign of Senator Helms and was a member of the National
Congressional Club, a political action committee that Helms helped organize. See
Marcia Coyle, Panel That Chose Starr Has Conservative Ties, NAT'L LJ., Aug. 22, 1994,
at A13, A13. President Reagan appointed Sentelle to the District Court for the
Western District of North Carolina in 1985, and to the D.C. Circuit in 1987.
2 Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (1978)
(codified as amended by the
Independent Counsel Reauthorization Acts of 1983, 1987 and 1994, at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 49, 591-99 (1994)). The ChiefJustice of the United States Supreme Court appoints
the three members of the Special Division, one of whom must be a judge from the
D.C. Circuit. See § 49(d). The other two members of the Special Division at the time
were judge Joseph T. Sneed of the Ninth Circuit, a Nixon appointee, andJudgeJohn
D. Butzner of the Fourth Circuit, aJohson appointee. See Coyle, supra note 1, at
A13.
In 1992, Bush Administration hostility and a threatened filibuster in the Senate-Republicans were angered by then-independent counsel Lawrence Walsh's longrunning Iran-Contra investigation-resulted in Congress's failure to reauthorize the
Ethics Act. SeeJohn Bryant, The Resurrectionof the Independent Counsel: The Casefor the
Reauthorization of Special Prosecutors,LEGAL TIMES, May 24, 1993, at 25, 25. By 1993,
with Democrats controlling both the White House and Congress, Senate Republican
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ment3 of an independent counsel4 to investigate investments by
President Clinton and his wife, Hillary, in the Whitewater Development Corporation, and loans to the Clintons from the failed Madison
Guaranty Savings & Loan-the so-called "Whitewater" affair.5
Attorney GeneralJanet Reno had requested that the Special Division
reappoint Robert B. Fiske, Jr.,' the independent counsel she had
chosen in January 1994.' Senators Helms and Faircloth, who had

opposition to reauthorization evaporated. SeeAdam Clymer, Republicans in About-Face
on Special ProsecutorLaw, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1993, atA16 (quoting Senator Bob Dole
(R-Kan.) as saying that, while he still doubted the need for the law, "if there was ever
a need, it is when one party controls everything"). On June 30, 1994, President
Clinton signed the Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994. SeePub. L. No.
103-270, 108 Stat. 732 (1994).
1 See § 49. For a description of the duties of the Special Division, see infra notes
39-49 and accompanying text.
4 In general, government officials, the press and the public have used the terms
"independent counsel," "special counsel," "special prosecutor" and "special attorney"
interchangeably. The Ethics in Government Act of 1978 used the term "special
prosecutor." See Pub. L. No. 95-521, tit. VI, § 602(a), 92 Stat. 1873, 1873 (1978).
Congress substituted "independent counsel" for "special prosecutor" when it
reauthorized the Act in 1983. See Act ofJan. 3, 1983, § 2, 96 Stat. 2039, 2039 (1983).
A meaningful distinction lies not so much in the title or authority given to an
appointee but in whether the Attorney General or the Special Division has made the
appointment-that is, whether the appointee is truly independent of the office of the
Attorney General.
' See generally Jeff Gerth, ClintonsJoined S. & L. Operator in an Ozark Real-Estate
Venture, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1992, § 1, at 1;Jeff Gerth, ClintonsRelease Tax DataShowing
Land Deal Losses, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1994, § 1, at 1.
6 See Letter to the Editor from Lawrence E. Walsh, No Need to Replace Whitewater
Counse4 N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1994, § 4, at 14 ("After Congress finally re-enacted the
Independent Counsel Act, the Attorney General petitioned the Special Division to
select Mr. Fiske as its appointee.").
ISee Independent Counsel: In re Madison Guar. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 59 Fed. Reg.
5321, 5321 (1994) (codified at 28 C.F.R. § 603.1) (stating the specific purpose of the
appointment and the authority given to the new independent counsel). Reno's
appointment of Fiske gave him the same authority as an independent counsel
appointed by the Special Division. SeeJurisdiction of the Independent Counsel, 28
C.FR. § 603.1 (1994).
The Attorney General has power to appoint "special attorneys" under 28 U.S.C.
§ 543 (1994). Reno appointed Fiske, a former United States Attorney and a
Republican, onJanuary 20, 1994, during the Ethics Act hiatus. She initially opposed
Republican demands that she appoint a Whitewater investigator, maintaining that
anyone she selected would be subject to charges of not being truly independent. See
Robert L. Jackson, GOPLawyer Picked to Probe Whitewater, LA TIMES, Jan. 21, 1994, at
A32. Upon Fiske's appointment, SenatorAlfonse M. D'Amato (R-N.Y.) described him
as "one of the most honorable and most skilled lawyers anywhere." Id. Senator Dole
commented that "people who know him think he is extremely well-qualified, is
independent," but added, "some of the conservative Republicans have not been happy
with him." Id. Dole was referring to opposition from conservatives on the Senate
Judiciary Committee when former Attorney General Richard Thornburgh proposed
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both been critical of Fiske's stewardship as independent counsel,
opposed his reappointment.8 Senator Faircloth had been an
especially vocal Fiske critic during the six days of Whitewater
hearings before the Senate Banking Committee, accusing Fiske of
being unaggressive and of having conflicts of interest.9 At least a
dozen Republican members of Congress had written to Judge
Sentelle in opposition to Fiske's reappointment.10
On August 5, 1994, less than three weeks after Judge Sentelle's
lunch with the two Senators, the Special Division replaced Fiske with
Kenneth W. Starr, a former Bush Administration Solicitor General
and D.C. Circuit Judge." Fiske was six months and some $2.5
million into his investigation. 2 In a brief opinion, the Special
Division noted that it would be inconsistent with the Ethics Act for
the Clinton Administration to play any part in the selection of the
independent counsel.1
Starr, like Fiske, had a strong reputation for fairness. Unlike
Fiske, however, Starr had strong Republican political affiliations.
A member of the Reagan Administration Justice Department, he
became the youngest judge ever named to the D.C. Circuit. 4 After
serving as the Bush Administration's Solicitor General, Starr headed
the Quayle Commission on civil justice reform. 5 He, too, could
Fiske as his top deputy during the Bush Administration. In 1987, Fiske had chaired
the ABA committee that evaluated potential court nominees. Conservatives blamed
Fiske for the ABA's tepid endorsement of Robert H. Bork's Supreme Court
nomination, which was ultimately defeated in the Senate. Thornburgh's proposal of
Fiske as his top deputy was ultimately dropped. See id.
8 See Murray, supranote 1, at A8.
I SeeJerry Seper, The Whitewater Counsel Switch: GOP Groundswell Questioned Fiske's
Effort in Inquiry, WASH. TIMEs, Aug. 8, 1994, at Al. Fiske's alleged conflicts of interest
included: his representation of Prudential-Bache and Smith Barney Shearson, firms
involved in bond underwriting for the Arkansas Development Finance Authority while
Clinton was the governor ofArkansas; his firm's representation of International Paper
Co., which sold land to the Whitewater Development Corp.; his collaboration on two
cases with Bernard Nussbaum, the White House counsel who had resigned because
of Whitewater, while both were in private practice; his involvement in the defense of
Clark Clifford and Robert Altman in the Bank of Credit and Commerce International
(BCCI) case with Robert Bennett, Clinton's attorney in the Paula CorbinJones sexual
harassment suit. See id.

10 See id.

" See In re Madison Guar. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, Div. No. 94-1, slip op. at 4 (Special
Division, D.C. Cir. Aug. 5, 1994).
12See HenryJ. Reske, AJudge's Lunch Debated,A.B.A. J., Nov. 1994, at 32, 32.
"See In re Madison Guar. Say. & Loan Ass'n, Div. No. 94-1, slip op. at 4 (Special
Division, D.C. Cir. Aug. 5, 1994).
14 See Rim Masters, Kenneth Starr, Supernova?, WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 1995, at El.
5 Coyle, supra note 1, at A13.
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have been described as having potential conflicts of interest
regarding Whitewater. These alleged conflicts, however, suggested
a potential bias against, rather than for, the Clinton Administration.
For instance, before being appointed by the Special Division, Starr
had agreed to represent the Independent Women's Forum, a
conservative Virginia legal policy group, in preparing a legal brief
arguing against President Clinton's claim that during his tenure in
office he should be immune from Paula Corbin Jones's sexual
harassment suit. 6 Unlike Fiske, Starr continued his private legal
work while serving as independent counsel. In 1995, Starr was
retained by the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation, a group that
provides substantial funding to the Free Congress Foundation,
American Spectatormagazine and the Landmark Legal Foundation. 7
Both the Free Congress Foundation and American Spectatorprovided
a media forum for Clinton's fiercest Whitewater critics, while the
Landmark Foundation provided legal counsel to Jean Lewis, the
Resolution Trust Corporation investigator who was one of the
18
President's chief Whitewater accusers.
News ofJudge Sentelle's lunch with Faircloth and Helms during
the Special Division's appointment process prompted Democratic
complaints and general concerns that the appointment of the new
independent counsel was made for partisan political reasons.
Senator Carl Levin (D-Mich.) wrote a letter to the Special Division
urging the judges to ask Starr for an accounting of his recent
partisan activities and to issue an opinion stating whether he
could fairly investigate a case involving a Democratic president."
The panel replied, in an unsigned unanimous opinion, that the
reauthorized independent counsel statute did not give it the power
to make such a request of Starr or to issue any opinions on his fitness
to remain the Whitewater prosecutor.20 Judge Sentelle, when ques16See DavidJohnston, Special CounselLinked to Suit Against Clinton, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
12, 1994, at A14. Starr later decided against writing the brief. See id. After his
appointment, Starr tried to counter accusations of partiality by adding Samuel Dash,
former chief counsel to the Senate Watergate committee, as an ethics counsel to his
staff. See Stephen Labaton, Whitewater ProsecutorAddingEthics Counsel to Allay Criticism,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1994, at A23.

"7SeeSam Skolnik, Kenneth Starr'sConservative Conflict? LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 23, 1995,
at 1.
'a See id.
'9 See DavidJohnston, ThreeJudges Spurn Proteston WhitewaterProsecutor,N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 19, 1994, at Al6.
2 See In re Madison Guar. Sav. & Loan Ass'n (Levin Letter/Motion), Div. No. 94-1,
slip op. at 2 (Special Division, D.C. Cir. Aug. 18, 1994).
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tioned about the lunch with the Senators, replied in a letter to
the Washington Post that, " [t] o the best of [his] recollection nothing
in these discussions concerned independent counsel matters. "21
In an unprecedented action, five former ABA presidents issued
ajoint statement addressed to the Special Division, asking the three
judges to act in an impartial manner when making future appointments. 22

The former ABA presidents described the meeting as

"'unfortunate, to say the least, "'23 and stated:

"Whether or not Mr. Fiske's replacement by Mr. Starr was discussed,
the meeting gives rise to the appearance of impropriety and the
public is left in doubt.... The special court must make sure in the
future that its selections of independent counsel are not just
objective, but also appear to be objective,
and to be made without
24
regard to political considerations."
They did not, however, call for Starr's resignation because they
25
had the "'utmost confidence in [his] integrity and objectivity.'"
In another response to the lunch meeting, two private citizens filed
formal complaints with the chief judge of the D.C. Circuit, Judge
Harry T. Edwards, seeking disciplinary action againstJudge Sentelle.26
The complaints were filed pursuant to the Judicial Councils
Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 ("Judicial
Conduct Act")2

On November 1, 1994, Judge Edwards dismissed the complaints
as not conforming with the substantive disciplinary standard of the
Judicial Conduct Act-the complainants failed to allege, as required
by statute, that Sentelle had engaged in conduct "prejudicial to the
effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts. "28
In the opinion, Judge Edwards emphasized that Judge
Reske, supra note 12, at 32.
See Susan Schmidt, Former ABA Presidents Criticize Panel That Chose Star, WASH.
PosT, Sept. 27, 1994, at A9. The five former ABA presidents were: Chesterfield Smith
(1973-1974), W. Reece Smith, Jr. (1980-1981), Robert MacCrate (1987-1988), Robert
D. Raven (1988-1989) andJohnJ. Curtin,Jr. (1990-1991). SeeReske, supranote 12,
at 32.
21

22

23
Reske,
24

supra note 12, at 32 (quoting the joint statement).

1Id. (quoting the joint statement).

I Id. (quoting the joint statement).

2

1 See Toni Locy, FormerABA Leaders Express Surpriseat Response to ComplaintsAbout
Judge, WASH. PosT, Nov. 3, 1994, at A9.
' Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035 (1980) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 331-32, 372,
604 (1994)).
28 28 U.S.C. § 372(c) (1) (1994); In re Charge ofJudicial Misconduct or Disability,
39 F.3d 374, 375 (Judicial Council, D.C. Cir. 1994). For a description of the
complaint procedure under the Judicial Conduct Act, see infra notes 125-32 and
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Sentelle's behavior could not be subject to discipline under the
Judicial Conduct Act because the primary business of the courts is
the resolution of "Cases" and "Controversies" within the jurisdiction
conferred by Article III of the Constitution, and because "[t]he
Special Division's authority to appoint an independent counsel arises
not from Article III ...

but from the Appointments Clause of Article

II, Section 2. ",29 The opinion stated that because the Ethics Act is
silent as to whether, or to what extent, members of the Special
Division may solicit or consider the views of outsiders, the panel was
free to consult opponents of the President in making the appointment.30 Judge Edwards concluded:
There may be some members of society who would question the
actions of the accused judge, for they have a pristine (albeit
arguably naive) view of the appointment process. But this is
irrelevant. The simple point here is that, even accepting the
complaints as true for the purposes of this analysis, the judge who
has been accused in this case would have violated no provision of
law or ethical Canon. There is no basis whatsoever for proceedings
against this judge."1
A majority of the D.C. Circuit Judicial Council endorsed Judge
Edwards's dismissal of the complaints.3 2 On May 30, 1995, the
Supreme Court denied a request, without comment, to overturn the
dismissal."3
This Comment discusses the interplay between two Watergate-

inspired statutes: the Judicial Conduct Act and the Ethics Act. Both
statutes were attempts to address misconduct by public officials.34
accompanying text.
' In re Charge ofjudicialMisconduct, 39 F.3d at 378.
30 See id. at 381-82 (stating that the fact that "those persons consulted might be
political opponents of the President or his party should not expose the selection

process to an anti-administration taint").
31 Id. at 382-83.

See Gilbert Cranberg, Speaking of Ethics, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1995, at A29.
See In re Mandanici, 115 S. Ct. 2270 (1995) (denying the petition for writ of
mandamus). Proceedings under the Judicial Conduct Act are administrative, not
12

judicial, in nature.

The statute creates no avenue for appeal to the Supreme

Court, and a Judicial Council's endorsement of a chief judge's dismissal of a

complaint normally terminates all proceedings. See infranotes 125-32 and accompanying text (describing the administrative process of the judicial Conduct Act).

See In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 506 (D.C. Cir.) ("The Watergate crisis is, of
... ."), rev'd sub nom. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S.
654 (1988); Stephen B. Burbank, Procedural Rulemaking Under the Judicial Councils
Reform andjudicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 283, 292
34

course, [the Ethics Act's] genesis

(1982) (describing how, during Senate debates on an early version of the judicial
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This Comment argues that the Judicial Conduct Act does and should
apply to the conduct of members of the Special Division, notwithstanding the fact that they make appointments pursuant to Article II.
Part I briefly describes the procedures of the Ethics Act and the
Supreme Court's decision in Morrison v. Olson,5 which determined
the constitutionality of the Ethics Act. In particular, Part I illustrates
how Justice Scalia's dissent in Morrison perceived the potential for
abuse of the appointment power by the Special Division. Part II
discusses in detail Chief Judge Edwards's opinion dismissing the
complaints against Judge Sentelle under the Judicial Conduct Act.
Part III examines possible amendments to the Ethics Act. It
concludes that there is no practical, effective way to amend the
Ethics Act to prevent Special Division abuse of the appointment
power without undermining the very purpose of the Act: the
expeditious appointment of a temporary prosecutor who is truly
independent from the Executive Branch to investigate potential
criminal behavior by members of that branch. Part IV argues that
Judge Edwards's formalistic conception of the scope of the Judicial
Conduct Act is inconsistent with the Act's legislative history, purpose
and practice. It concludes that applying the Judicial Conduct Act to
the actions of judges on the Special Division is the simplest, most
sensible way to ensure the proper functioning of the Ethics Act.
I. THE ETHICS ACT, THE SPECIAL DIVISION
AND MORRISON V. OLSON
A. Ethics Act Procedures and the Special Division

Title VI of the Ethics in Government Act0 6 provides for the
appointment of an independent counsel for the investigation and, if
necessary, the prosecution of certain high-ranking government officials for violations of federal criminal law.37 The statute requires
disciplinary legislation, "Watergate was on everybody's mind").
35 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
36

28 U.S.C. §§ 49, 591-99 (1994).

11 Sections 591(a) and (c) (1) provide that the Act applies to violations of any
"[f] ederal criminal law other than a violation classified as a Class B or C misdemeanor
or an infraction." Individuals who may be investigated under the Act include the
President, the Vice President, Cabinet officials, high-ranking officials in the Executive
Office of the President and in the Justice Department, the Director and the Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and certain
officials in the President's election or reelection campaign. See § 591(b); Morrison,487
U.S. at 660 n.2.
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the Attorney General to conduct a preliminary investigation
whenever she receives "information sufficient to constitute grounds
to investigate whether any person [covered by the Act] may have
violated Federal criminal law." 8
The Act's major innovation is the creation of a three-judge panel
for the purpose of appointing independent counsels.3 9 When the
Attorney General has completed her investigation, or when ninety
days have elapsed, she must report to the Special Division. If she
determines that "there are no reasonable grounds to believe that
further investigation is warranted" and so notifies the Special Division, the panel "shall have no power to appoint an independent
counsel with respect to the matters involved."4" If, however, the
Attorney General determines that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that further investigation is warranted, she must submit an
application to the Special Division for the appointment of an
independent counsel.4
Upon receipt of the Attorney General's application, the Special
Division "shall appoint an appropriate independent counsel and shall
define that independent counsel's prosecutorial jurisdiction."42 The
Act places few restrictions on the Special Division's selection: the
panel must appoint an individual with "appropriate experience...
who will conduct the investigation and any prosecution in a prompt,
responsible and cost-effective manner."43 To ensure an effective,
thorough inquiry, the Act vests the Special Division's appointee with
the full investigative and prosecutorial powers of the Attorney General. 44
Beyond appointing the independent counsel and setting her
jurisdiction, the Special Division's duties are mostly administrative.
3s§ 591(a).
'9 See § 49(a) ("Threejudges or justices shall be assigned... to be the division of
the court for the purpose of appointing independent counsels."). A division of the
D.C. Circuit, the Special Division consists of three circuit courtjudges appointed for
two-year terms by the ChiefJustice of the United States Supreme Court. One of the
judges must be from the D.C. Circuit, and no two of the judges may be from the same
circuit. See § 49(d).
o § 592(b)(1).
4'See § 592(c) (1)(A).
42§ 593(b) (1). The Attorney General's application must contain "sufficient
information" to assist the panel in selecting the independent counsel and defining her

jurisdiction. See § 592(d). Either the Attorney General or the independent counsel
may subsequently apply to the Special Division for an expansion of the initially
determined jurisdiction. See § 593(c).
4'§ 598(b) (2).

See § 594(a).
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The panel receives periodic reports from the independent counsel
and decides whether and how much of the reports to release to the
public.45
Although the Attorney General has power under
§ 596(a) (1) to remove the independent counsel "for good cause,"
this decision is not subject to review by the Special Division, but
rather in a civil action in the D.C. District Court. 6
The office of the independent counsel terminates when it notifies
the Attorney General that it has completed or substantially completed its investigation or prosecution. 7 In addition, the Special
Division may, acting either on its own initiative or at the suggestion
of the Attorney General, terminate the office of the independent
counsel if it finds that the investigation is "completed or so substan48
tially completed that [termination] would be appropriate."
Finally, to preserve the appointee's independence even from the
Special Division, the Act forbids any member of the panel from
participating in any judicial proceeding that involves the independent counsel's official duties.49 The Act thus creates a panel of
Article IIIjudges with limited non-Article III powers, the most central
of which is the power to make an appointment that is normally made
by the Executive Branch.
B. In re Sealed Case and Morrison v. Olson
Ten years after the passage of the Ethics Act, the Special
Division's appointment power and its alleged effect on the separation
of powers prescribed by the Constitution came under constitutional
attack. The D.C. Circuit, in In re Sealed Case,5" declared the Ethics
Act unconstitutional. The Supreme Court, in Morrison v. Olson,5
reversed the D.C. Circuit's decision. Both the Court of Appeals's
opinion andJustice Scalia's dissent in Morrisonrecognized the poten45 See § 594(h).

I See § 596(a) (3). The original version of the Act allowed the Special Division to
hear such an action. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 664 n.8 (1988) (noting that

"[u]nder the Act as originally enacted, an independent counsel who was removed
could obtain judicial review of the Attorney General's decision in a civil action

commenced before the Special Division").
47See § 596(b) (1).
4s § 596(b) (2). The Supreme Court has described this provision as "a device for
removing from the public payroll an independent counsel who has served his purpose,
but is unwilling to acknowledge the fact." Morrison, 487 U.S. at 683.
49 See 28 U.S.C. § 49(f).

50 838 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd sub nor. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
51487 U.S. 654 (1988).

2546 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 144: 2537

tial for abuse of the Special Division's powers under the Act. The
concerns raised about the Special Division's replacement of Robert
Fiske with Kenneth Starr, including the complaints filed against
Judge Sentelle, were responses to the perception that precisely such
an abuse of power had occurred in the Whitewater investigation.
The D.C. Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Silberman, rested its
decision in In re Sealed Case on the ground that the Ethics Act
was inconsistent with the Appointments Clause of Article II. The
court stated that because the independent counsel in the case was
not an inferior officer, the power to appoint her could not be
vested constitutionally in a court of law.5" Anticipating that the Supreme Court would review its decision, however, the Court of Appeals
also decided the appellants' 5 other constitutional claims: it held,
first, that the Ethics Act violated the Constitution because it
impermissibly interfered with the President's duty to "take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed,"5 4 and second, that the Act
violated Article III and the separation of powers doctrine because it
entrusted an Article III court with an executive function.55
In its analysis of the latter alternative ground for the decision, the
court stated that the doctrine of separation of powers could be violated either when "'[o]ne branch ... interfere[s] impermissibly with
[another's] performance of its constitutionally assigned function,'"
or "'when one branch assumes a function.., more properly... entrusted to another.'"" Given that Article III limits the power of the
52 See In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d at 487. Under the Constitution, courts of law may
appoint only inferior officers. The Appointments Clause provides that the President:
shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall
appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the
supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established
by Law; but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior
Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law,
or in the Heads of Departments.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
11 The District Court had held the Act to be constitutional. See In re Sealed Case,
665 F. Supp. 56, 62 (D.D.C. 1987) (mem.).
5 U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 3; see also In re Sealed Case, 888 F.2d at 487. The court
found that the Act's appointment, removal and supervisory provisions "so deeply
invade[d] the President's executive prerogatives and responsibilities and so
jeopardize[d] individual liberty as to be unconstitutional." Id. at 511.
55 See In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d at 511.
11 Id. (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 963 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring)
(citations omitted)).
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judiciary to resolving "Cases" and "Controversies," 7 the court found
it inappropriate that the Act assigned to the Special Division the
power not only to appoint the independent counsel but also the duty
to supervise her activities-powers traditionally reserved to the
Executive Branch."8
This supervisory role, like many executive-type duties, almost
inevitably involved the Special Division in decisionmaking "in the
context of swirling controversy in which various factions hoped for
opposing outcomes" and where decisions "necessarily rested on
indeterminate considerations of policy and on information brought
to the decisionmaker's attention through various avenues, including
ex parte communications."5 9 The court feared that such intimate
involvement in the supervision of a politically charged investigation
undermined the status of the judiciary as a neutral forum for dispute
60
resolution.
In addition to concerns about the appearance of partiality, the
court suggested that involving Article III judges too deeply in executive power could lead to judicial abuse of that power. The court
quoted The FederalistPapers:. "'Were [the judicial power] joined to
the executive power, the judge might behave with all the violence of
an oppressor."' 61 The Ethics Act, the court believed, vested the
Special Division with powers which created the appearance of
partiality and the potential for abuse.
62
The Supreme Court, however, disagreed. In Morrison v. Olson,
ChiefJustice Rehnquist's opinion for the majority reversed the D.C.
Circuit on each of its three grounds for decision. The Court held
that the independent counsel was an inferior officer, and that thus,
there was no conflict with the Appointments Clause.6 3 The Court
57

U.S. CONST. art. IlI, § 2.
" See In reSealed Case, 838 F.2d at 511-12 ("[T]he act impermissibly takes a central
responsibility from the Executive Branch in violation of Article U.").
11 Id. at 513. The political controversies surrounding both the Iran-Contra
investigation and the Whitewater investigation lend credence to this assertion.
60 See id. at 512 (stating that the duties prescribed for the Special Division judges
under the Ethics Act could overinvolve them "'in the process of policy and thereby
weaken confidence in the disinterestedness of their judicatory functions'" (quoting
Felix Frankfurter, Advisory Opinions, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 475,
478 (1930))).
62 Id. at 516 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 334 (James Madison) (J. Cooke
ed., 1961) (quoting Montesquieu)).
62 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
1 See id. at 670-75. The Court reasoned that the independent counsel was an
inferior officer because she was subject to removal by a higher executive branch
official and had limited duties, jurisdiction and tenure under the Ethics Act. See id.
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also held that the Ethics Act did not impermissibly interfere with the
functions of the Executive Branch6 4 and did not violate Article
5
III.
With regard to the Article III concerns expressed by the Court of
Appeals, the Court reasoned that if Congress wanted to remove the
appointing authority from the Executive Branch-for fear of the
conflicts of interest that could arise in situations where the Executive
Branch is called upon to investigate one of its own high-ranking
officers-"the most logical place to put it was in the Judicial
Branch."6 6 This transfer of Article II appointment power to a panel
of Article III judges did not, the Court believed, "pose[] any threat
to the 'impartial and independent federal adjudication of claims
within the judicial power of the United States. '"67
The Court based this conclusion on the fact that the Ethics Act
did not give the Special Division power to review any of the independent counsel's actions or any of the Attorney General's actions with
regard to the counsel.6
Also, the Act prohibited members of the
Special Division from participating in "'any judicial proceeding
concerning a matter involving the independent counsel."' 69 Thus,
the Court considered the Special Division "sufficiently isolated...
from the review of the activities of the independent counsel so as to
avoid any taint of the independence of the Judiciary such as would
7
render the Act invalid under Article III."
The Court's measure of what types of activity could pose a threat
to the status of the judiciary as a neutral forum for the resolution of
"Cases" and "Controversies" was markedly different from that
expressed in the D.C. Circuit's opinion in In re Sealed Case. In the
Court's analysis, only judicial review by the Special Division-of
either the actions of the independent counsel or of any judicial proceedings related to matters investigated by the counsel-could constitute a threat to the impartiality of Article III judges. 7 That is, only

at 671-72.
"See id. at 685-96.

See id. at 677-85.
6Id.

67

at 677.

1Id. at 683 (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833,

850 (1986)).
6See

id.

IId. at 683-84 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 49(f) (1994)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 596(a) (3)
(1994).
70 Id.
71

at 684.

See id. at 684-85.
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Article III behavior could weaken public confidence in the disinterestedness of the judiciary.
In the D.C. Circuit opinionJudge Silberman put forth a broader
measure. The Special Division's activities pursuant to its purported
Article II appointment power, if such activities involved the judges
too intimately in "swirling [political] controvers[ies],"72 could pose
a threat to the perception of a neutral judiciary. The lower court
opinion recognized the threat that the appearance of political bias
could pose, even if this appearance arose outside of an Article III
73
proceeding. The Supreme Court opinion ignored this possibility.
Judge Silberman, at the end of his opinion, quoted Judge Skelly
Wright: "'The need to preserve judicial integrity is more than just a
matter ofjudges satisfying themselves that the environment in which
they work is sufficiently free of interference to enable them to administer the law honorably and efficiently. Litigants and our citizenry in
general must also be satisfied."'7 4
Justice Scalia's lone dissent in Morrison directly addressed the
problem of the Special Division's potential to abuse its appointment
power under the Ethics Act. The main thrust of Scalia's argument
accorded with Judge Silberman's argument: the Ethics Act and the
majority's decision upholding the constitutionality of the Act
replaced the principle of separation of powers, specifically, Article
II's requirement that "[t]he executive Power ... be vested in a

President of the United States of America,"'75 with a standardless
balancing test.76 Near the close of his dissent, however, Scalia
addressed "the fairness of the process" that those covered by the Act
I In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 513 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
"Judge Edwards's opinion in the dismissal of the complaints against Judge
Sentelle echoes the Morrisonmajority's narrow measure of conduct that undermines
public confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary. See In re Charge of Judicial
Misconduct or Disability, 39 Egd 374, 380 (Judicial Council, D.C. Cir. 1994) ("[I]n
creating the Special Division, Congress recognized the difference between the
appointment and judicial powers by making it clear that ajudge who participates in
the selection of an independent counsel while a member of the Special Division
cannot thereafter participate in a judicial proceeding involving the independent
counsel .... ."); see also infra Part II.
' In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d at 517 (quoting Hobson v. Hansen, 265 F. Supp. 902,
931 75(D.D.C. 1967) (WrightJ., dissenting)) (citation omitted).
U.S. CONSr. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
71See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 711 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("What
are the standards to determine how the balance is to be struck, that is, how much
removal of Presidential power is too much? ...The most amazing feature of the
Court's opinion is that it does not even purport to give an answer.").

2550 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 144: 2537

received.77 Noting initially "the vast power and the immense
discretion that are placed in the hands of a prosecutor,"7 s Scalia
asserted that the primary check against the abuse of this power and
discretion is a political one-prosecutors are selected and can be
removed by the President, and when prosecutors abuse their power
the President pays the cost in political damage to his administration.79
The Ethics Act, however, created a process that is not in the full
control of the Attorney General or any prosecutor appointed by the
President. ° Any flaws, either in the independent counsel's selection or in her subsequent behavior, cannot be blamed on the
President.8 ' Here, Scalia articulated the same concerns raised six
years later regarding Judge Sentelle's behavior on the Special
Division in the Whitewater investigation:
An independent counsel is selected, and the scope of his or her
authority prescribed, by a panel of judges. What if they are
politically partisan, as judges have been known to be, and select a
prosecutor antagonistic to the administration, or even to the
particular individual who has been selected for this special
treatment? There is no remedy for that, not even a political one.
Judges, after all, have life tenure, and appointing a surefire
enthusiastic prosecutor could hardly be considered an impeachable
offense ....[E]ven if it were entirely evident that unfairness was

in fact the result-the judges hostile to the administration, the
independent counsel an old foe of the President, the staff refugees
from the recently defeated administration-there would be no one
accountable to the public to whom the blame could be assigned.8 2

While Justice Scalia was quick to add that he had the highest regard
for the judges on the Special Division and that such abuses of power
would rarely occur, he nonetheless asserted that the Ethics Act
afforded unfair process to those it covered: "[T]he fairness of a
process must be adjudged on the basis of what it permits to happen,
not what it produced in a particular case.""8
Both Judge Silberman's opinion in In re Sealed Case and Justice
Scalia's dissent in Morrison argued that the Ethics Act violated the
77Id. at 727.
78

Id.

71See id. at 727-29.

"oSee id.

81 S, id.
82 Id. at 729-31.

83Id. at 731.
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Constitution. Judge Silberman warned that, by giving executive
power to a panel of Article III judges, the Act would mire judges in
political disputes and thus undermine the public's confidence in the
judiciary's impartiality in deciding "Cases" and "Controversies."
Justice Scalia moved beyond appearances and warned that the Special
Division could abuse its appointment power with a politically partisan
choice for an independent prosecutor. Neither opinion won the day.
The remainder of this Comment addresses Justice Scalia's
contention that no remedy exists for the abuse of Special Division
appointment power. Judge Edwards's opinion dismissing the
complaints against Judge Sentelle would seem to suggest that,
indeed, no remedy exists.
II. IN RE CHARGE OFJUDICIALMISCONDUCT OR DISABILI'I

4

The complaints 5 before Judge Edwards alleged judicial misconduct by Judge Sentelle on the Special Division and sought relief
under the Judicial Conduct Act."
The principal substantive
standard of the Judicial Conduct Act is that federal appellate, district,
bankruptcy and magistrate judges will not "engage[] in conduct
prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the
business of the courts.""7 Collectively, the complaints alleged: (1)
that Judge Sentelle's lunch with Senators Faircloth and Helms and
his receipt of and failure to disclose correspondence from other
members of Congress 8 constituted ex parte communications in
violation of Canon 3 (A) (4) of the Code of Conduct for United States
Judges; 9 and (2) that the lunch meeting that took place while
1139 F.3d 374

(Judicial Council, D.C. Cir. 1994).
'Judge Edwards identified three separate complaints in his opinion: Nos. 94-8,
94-9 and 94-10. See id. at 377. The press reported two complainants: Sarah
Ruschaupt of Virginia and Francis Mandanici of Connecticut. See Murray, supranote
1, at A8.
85 28 U.S.C. §§ 331-32, 372, 604 (1994).
87 § 372(c)(1).

8 See supranote 10 and accompanying text.
89

CODE OF CONDuCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 3(A) (4) [hereinafter

CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT] ("Ajudge should.., neither initiate nor consider ex
parte... communications on the merits, or procedures affecting the merits, of a
pending or impending proceeding."). This Code was adopted in 1992 by the Judicial
Conference of the United States, an annual gathering of the ChiefJustice of the U.S.
Supreme Court, the chiefjudge of eachjudicial circuit, the chiefjudge of the Court

of International Trade, and a district judge from each judicial circuit. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 331 (1994). The Code "governs the conduct of United States CircuitJudges, Court
of International Trade Judges, Court of Federal Claims Judges, Bankruptcy Judges,
and Magistrate Judges." CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDuCT n.1.
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Judge Sentelle was considering the appointment of the Whitewater
independent counsel as well as Judge Sentelle's "judgment" in
appointing Kenneth Starr created the "appearance of impropriety."90 The complaints sought relief in the form of Judge Sentelle's
"voluntary retirement" from the Special Division, a review of the
appointment of Starr, and a public reprimand for Judge Sentelle's
misconduct.91
Judge Edwards, describing the complaints as "misguided,"
dismissed them on the ground that they did not conform with the
Judicial Conduct Act.92 He relied on the facts that the Special
Division made its appointment acting under the Appointments
Clause of Article II and that no constitutional or ethical precept
prohibited consultations during the appointment process. Also,
Judge Edwards noted that nothing in the Ethics Act itself limited
consultations by the Special Division.93
A. The JurisdictionalQuestion
Before dismissing the complaints, however, Judge Edwards
addressed the question of whether a member of the Special Division could even be subject to disciplinary proceedings in the
D.C. Circuit. This jurisdictional question seems to be, on its
face, easy to answer. The section of the Ethics Act creating the
Special Division explicitly describes it as "a division of the
94
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia."
Thus, although two members of the Special Division are not from the
D.C. Circuit, Judge Sentelle is a D.C. Circuit judge and, therefore,
95
should be subject to disciplinary proceedings in his home circuit.
While he ultimately did assume that jurisdiction existed for the
D.C. Judicial Council to hear the complaints, Judge Edwards's
90 In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct or Disability, 39 F.3d 374, 377 (Judicial
Council, D.C. Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). The "appearance of impropriety"
language is found in the Code of Judicial Conduct: "A judge should avoid

impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities." CODE
CONDUCT Canon 2.
"' In re Charge ofJudicial Misconduct, 39

OF JUDICIAL

F.d at 377. Voluntary retirement from

Article III duties and public reprimand are two of the remedies available under the
Judicial Conduct Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 372(c) (6) (B) (iii), (iv) (1994).
92 In re Charge ofjudicial Misconduct, 39 F.3d at 376.

s See id.
o 28 U.S.C. § 49(a) (1994).

95 See D.C. CIR. JUDICIAL MISCONDucr OR DISABILry P 1(c) commentary at 4
("[T]he circuit in which ajudge or magistrate holds office is the appropriate circuit
in which to file a complaint.").
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analysis of this issue emphasized the separateness of the Special
Division from the D.C. Circuit. He noted that the Special Division
keeps its own records and establishes its own procedures.96 He also
noted that because the Special Division must include two judges who
are not members of the D.C. Circuit, it cannot constitute a panel
authorized to hear "Cases" or "Controversies" within the D.C.
Circuit's jurisdiction. 97 Notwithstanding these potential obstacles,
Judge Edwards found jurisdiction because of Judge Sentelle's
membership on the D.C. Circuit and because Judge Sentelle did not
contest disciplinary proceedings in the D.C. Circuit.9 Judge Edwards also found support for hisjurisdictional holding by analogizing
Judge Sentelle's service on the Special Division to the case of ajudge
who is "visiting" another circuit and who is thus still subject to the
disciplinary authority of his home circuit.99
Judge Sentelle, however, was not visiting another circuit. The
Special Division, as noted above, is part of the D.C. Circuit; Judge
Sentelle is a member of the D.C. Circuit. Judge Edwards's jurisdictional questions would make more sense if the subject judge in the
complaints were one of the other two judges on the Special Division
who was not from the D.C. Circuit.
A possible explanation forJudge Edwards'sjurisdictional inquiry
emerges from the sharp distinction he later draws between conduct
by ajudge under Article II and judicial conduct under Article III. It
is primarily this distinction that Judge Edwards used as his justification in dismissing the complaints.
B. ChiefJudge Edwards's Article I/Article III Distinctionfor Purposes of
the Judicial Conduct Act
In addressing the central issue of whether the complaints against
Judge Sentelle alleged "conduct prejudicial to the effective and
expeditious administration of the business of the courts,""'0 Judge
Edwards initially noted that the primary business of the D.C. Circuit
is the resolution of "Cases" and "Controversies" within the jurisdiction conferred by Article III.101 This fact, however, might not
9' See In re Charge ofJudidalMisconduct 39 F.3d at 378.
97See id.
9

8See id.

19
See id.; see also D.C. CIR. JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT

OR DISABILTY R. 1 (c) commentary at 4 ("Complaints against a visiting judge from this circuit should be filed here.").
100 28 U.S.C. § 372(c) (1) (1994).
101In re Charge of Judiciai Misconduct or Disability, 39 F.3d 374, 378 (Judicial
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dispose of the question, Judge Edwards continued, because of
differing interpretations of the scope of the substantive standard
governing actions under the Judicial Conduct Act.1 2 The "business
of the courts" might be interpreted to apply only to Article III
business; alternatively, the statute might also cover conduct having
only an
indirect prejudicial effect on the courts' judicial func3
tion.

10

In the end, Judge Edwards found it unnecessary to determine the
breadth of the statutory standard, "[f]or however broadly the
statutory standard is to be read, complainants do not allege conduct
by the subject judge that could have even an indirect prejudicial
effect on the administration of the business of the courts."1°'
Because the Special Division exercised Article II appointment power,
and because this power is by its nature entrusted to the discretion of
the appointing authority, safeguards such as the prohibition against
ex parte contacts and the "appearance of impropriety" were mostly
irrelevant.0 5 The appointment of an independent counsel by the
Special Division was not an adversarial proceeding; thus, Judge
Edwards reasoned, Judge Sentelle's conduct while on the Special
Division could not have had even an indirect prejudicial effect on the
administration of the business of the courts.
Finally, Judge Edwards dismissed the complaints against Judge
Sentelle, noting that: the Ethics Act was silent as to whether, or to
what extent, members of the Special Division could consult with
outsiders in the course of making an appointment; it would make
little sense in Judge Edwards's view to impose any restrictions; and,
the Special Division's past practice had been to consult with
outsiders.1

6

C. The Inconsistency Between ChiefJudgeEdwards'sJurisdictionalArgument and His Article IH/Article IX Distinction

This Comment argues that, contrary to judge Edwards's opinion,
determining the breadth of the Judicial Conduct Act's substantive
standard is necessary for the correct disposition of complaints about
judicial conduct on the Special Division, regardless of the Article II
Council, D.C. Cir. 1994).
102 See id. at 378-79.
s See id. at 379.
104 Id. (emphasis omitted).
'10See id. at 379-80.
106 See id. at 380-82.
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nature of the Division's appointment power. Part III argues that
there is no effective way to amend the Ethics Act to address Special
Division abuse of its appointment power without undermining the
purposes of the Ethics Act. Part IV argues that a remedy under
the Judicial Conduct Act would be effective,justifiable and attractively simple. The legislative history, purpose and practice of the
Judicial Conduct Act suggest that Judge Sentelle's conduct during
the appointment of Kenneth Starr should fall within that Act's scope.
Before turning to possible solutions, however, it is worth noting
the inconsistency between Judge Edwards'sjurisdictional analysis and
his strict Article II/Article III distinction for purposes of the Judicial
Conduct Act. Judge Edwards analogized Judge Sentelle's membership on the Special Division to the case of ajudge "visiting" another
circuit. 10 7 Ajudge visiting another circuit would likely be performing Article III duties. The Special Division, however, only performs
Article II duties. The fact that an Article III judge was involved in
both situations made the situations sufficiently analogous for Judge
Edwards to find jurisdiction under the Judicial Conduct Act. Later
in the opinion, however, Judge Edwards asserted that Article II
conduct by an Article IIIjudge could in no way have even an indirect
prejudicial effect on the administration of the business of the
courts. 0 8 Thus, Judge Edwards used Judge Sentelle's status as an
Article IIIjudge to assertjurisdiction under the Judicial Conduct Act
over Article II conduct, but he ignored that same status in weighing
whetherJudge Sentelle's conduct on the Special Division could have
had any effect on the business of the courts. Judge Edwards felt that
there was a distinction, but to the general public, both situations
involve an Article IIIjudge. Why does Article III status matter in the
jurisdictional realm but not in the real world?
III. AN UNWIELDY SOLUTION: AMENDING THE ETHICS ACT
Under Judge Edwards's conception of the Judicial Conduct Act,
the only way to prevent judges on the Special Division from abusing
their appointment powers to achieve partisan ends is to amend the
Ethics Act in some way to restrict the Special Division's discretion.
The Ethics Act as codified places few restrictions on the Special
Division's appointment power beyond requiring that the appointee
107 See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
'o

See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
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have appropriate experience. 1 9 Other instances involving judicial
appointment power under Article II provide few, if any, helpful
analogues. 110
. Placing some form of statutory restrictions on consultations by
the Special Division in making their appointments would be both
unrealistic and counterproductive. As Judge Edwards stated in his
opinion: "It makes little sense to think that an authority acting
pursuant to the Appointment Clause of Article II might be forbidden
from consulting with others regarding candidates for appointment.
It is hard to imagine how anyone would go about that task without
seeking advice.""' The sheer difficulty and virtual absurdity of
trying to decide beforehand whom to exclude-members of
Congress?, anyone in a political party different from that of the
President?-militates against such a course. In the past, the Special
Division has routinely relied on discussions with judicial colleagues
and former professional associates 12 Arguably, imposing such
restrictions could result in the appointment of independent counsels
in whose abilities the Special Division lacks confidence.
Other possible restrictions include requiring that the Special
Division choose from a list of potential appointees it has compiled
before the Attorney General applies for the appointment, or that the
Special Division choose from among potential appointees supplied
by the Attorney General. The first of these suggestions could prevent
the Special Division from handpicking an independent counsel who
would be unduly antagonistic to the subject of the investigation-a
"guided missile." This potential benefit, however, is also a potential
1oSee supra note 43 and accompanying text.
110See, e.g., Young v. United States ex reL Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 809
(1987) (holding that the district court had authority to appoint a special prosecutor
to prosecute defendants for contempt so long as "counsel for a party that is the
beneficiary of a court order [was not] appointed as prosecutor in a contempt action
alleging a violation of that order"); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 398 (1879)
(holding that an Act of Congress giving circuit courts power to appoint supervisors of
elections did not violate separation of powers and placing no restrictions on this
power); United States v. Solomon, 216 F. Supp. 835, 843 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (holding that
the appointment of a temporary United States Attorney by a district court does not
violate separation of powers and placing no restrictions on the court's discretion).
...
In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct or Disability, 39 F.3d 374, 380 (Judicial
Council, D.C. Cir. 1994).
112See KATY J.

HARRINGER,

INDEPENDENT JUSTICE:

THE FEDERAL

SPECIAL

PROSECUTOR IN AMERICAN POLITICS 150-51 (1992) ("Engaging a known quantity is a
high priority, so, in practice, the 'old-boy network' plays a major role in the
decision.").
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flaw: all of those on the prearranged list of appointees may be
inappropriate choices for the particular type of case that arises."'
The second suggestion would give the Attorney General the
power to propose, but not to appoint, whereas the Special Division would have the power to appoint, but not to propose. The
Special Division could reject the Attorney General's candidates
until the Attorney General came up with someone the Special
Division felt was appropriately independent. The Attorney General
would have an incentive to pick an independent candidate early on
because it would be politically embarrassing to be repeatedly
rejected.
While this suggestion has some appeal, it has two flaws. One is
procedural. The appointment process could become a high-profile
game of political "chicken," with the Attorney General stubbornly
refusing to propose an independent candidate and the Special
Division stubbornly refusing to appoint any of the proposed partisan
candidates. This would not serve the public's desire for a prompt
investigation. The second flaw is substantive. The Senate Report on
the Ethics Act stated that "[t]he entire purpose of appointing a
temporary special prosecutor is to get someone who is independent,
both in reality and appearance, from the President and the Attorney
General.""' Such a restriction on the Special Division's appointment power would arguably defeat the whole purpose of the Ethics
Act.
The difficulty in amending the Ethics Act in a manner that would
satisfactorily deter abuse of the Special Division's appointment power
makes application of the Judicial Conduct Act seem not only
appropriate but attractively simple. AsJustice Scalia suggested, such
abuses will rarely occur." 5 Judicial awareness of the sensitivity of
the Special Division's duties is required. An amendment to the
Ethics Act is not.

"' A former member of the Special Division described the importance of case type
in the selection process: "'First, we considered the type of case, and then we looked
for lawyers, usually former prosecutors, who might fall into that type.'" Coyle, supra
note 1, at A13 (quoting an unnamed former panel member).
14 S. REP. No. 170, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 56, 65-66 (1977),
reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.CA.N. 4216, 4281-82.
1

See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 731 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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IV. A SENSIBLE REMEDY FOR A RARE PROBLEM:
ABUSE OF SPECIAL DIVISION APPOINTMENT POWER SHOULD FALL
WITHIN THE AMBIT OF THE JUDICIAL CONDUCT ACT
Justice Scalia, in his Morrisondissent, warned that there would be
16
no remedy for Special Division abuse of the appointment power.
This Part argues that partisan use of the appointment power granted
to Article III judges under the Ethics Act constitutes "conduct
prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the
business of the courts"'1 7 under the Judicial Conduct Act. The
possibility ofjudicial discipline under the Judicial Conduct Act would
dampen the temptation to use the Article II power of the Special
Division for partisan political ends. Article IIIjudges would not mire
themselves in the often swirling political disputes surrounding the
use of independent counsels-Judge Silberman's fear in In re Sealed
Casell-and thus would not weaken public confidence in the
judiciary."9
Moreover, such an interpretation of the Judicial
Conduct Act neither undermines the purpose of the Special Division
nor imprudently broadens the substantive scope of the Judicial
Conduct Act.
After a brief description of the provisions of the Judicial Conduct
Act, this Part examines in detail the substantive standard governing
discipline under the Act. The legislative history of the Act, and
practice under the Act, support the view that the complaints against
Judge Sentelle's conduct were in conformity with § 372(c) (1).
A.

The Provisions of the Judicial Conduct Act

A legislative child of the Watergate scandal,1 20 the Judicial Conduct Act-pithily named the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial
Conduct and Disability Act of 1980121-was intended to provide a
supplement to the constitutional processes for impeachment and trial
of federal judges. 122 Concerns about judicial independence and
116 See

supra note 82 and accompanying text.

117 28 U.S.C. § 372(c) (1) (1994).

838 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
120 See supra note 34.
12128 U.S.C. §§ 331-32, 372, 604 (1994). For a listing of the Act's misconduct and
18
19

disability provisions, see § 372(c).
" See Stephen B. Burbank, Politics and Progress in Implementing the FederalJudicial
DisciplineAct, 71 JUDICATURE 13, 13 (1987) (noting that the major controversies that
led to the Act included "the need for and the constitutionality of any statutory process
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the constitutionality of disciplinary legislation for Article III judges
resulted in this piece of compromise legislation. Congress did not
include removal among the Act's remedies and gave responsibility for
implementing the Act to the judiciary, acting through the preexisting
judicial councils of each circuit. 2 Since its passage, the Act has
withstood both legal and scholarly challenges to its constitutionality.124

Under the Act, any person alleging that an appellate, district,
bankruptcy or magistrate judge has engaged in "conduct prejudicial
to the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the
courts" may file a written complaint containing a brief statement of
the facts with the Circuit Court of Appeals under whose jurisdiction
the judge sits." After "expeditiously" reviewing the complaint, the
chief judge may dismiss the complaint if it is not in conformity with
the substantive standard of the Act, if it is directly related to the
merits of a decision or procedural ruling, or if it is "frivolous."
Alternatively, the chief judge may conclude the proceeding upon a
finding that appropriate corrective action has been taken. 126 If the
for addressing the problems ofjudicial misconduct or disability and... the fairness
and adequacy of the means by which the federal judiciary had addressed the problems
in the past").
123 See id.
124 Proceedings under the Act against United States District Judge Alcee L.
Hastings provided a years-long, comprehensive attack on the constitutionality of
the Act. See Hastings v. Judicial Conference, 829 F.2d 91, 106 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(holding that the Act's standards of misconduct were not unconstitutionally vague
or overbroad); In re Certain Complaints Under Investigation by an Investigating
Comm. of the Judicial Council of the Eleventh Circuit, 788 F.2d 1488, 1505-16 (11th
Cir. 1986) (holding, in an action by Judge Hastings's staff to quash subpoenas, that
the Act did not violate separation of powers); Hastings v. Judicial Conference, 770
F.2d 1093, 1103 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding that claims that the Act was unconstitutional on separation of powers and due process grounds, and as applied, were
premature). Judge Edwards believes that the Act is unconstitutional. See Harry T.
Edwards, Regulating Judicial Misconduct and Divining "Good Behavior" for Federal
Judges, 87 MICH. L. REv. 765, 766 (1989) ("[T]he only constitutionally permissible
way to regulate judicial misconduct and disability that does not involve impeachable
action is through a system ofjudicial self-regulation unencumbered by any form of
congressional interference."). For other criticism of the Act's constitutionality,
see Lynn A. Baker, Note, Unnecessary and Improper: The Judicial Councils Reform
andJudicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 94 YALE L.J. 1117, 1118 (1985)
(arguing that the Act violates the Constitution's allocation of powers by requiring the
judicial councils and theJudicial Conference to exercise a power of scrutiny over their
Article III colleagues, which the Constitution promises that only Congress will
exercise).
12 See § 372(c) (1) (4).
126 See § 372(c) (3).
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chief judge decides neither to dismiss nor to conclude the proceeding, the chiefjudge appoints himself and an equal number of circuit
of the circuit to a special committee to investigate
and districtjudges
27
1

the matter.

After an investigation, the special committee files a report of its
128
findings and recommendations with the circuit's judicial council.
conduct a further investigation and take
The judicial council may
"appropriate" action. 1 In addition, the council may refer the
complaint, the record and its recommendations to the Judicial
The council is obligated to
Conference of the United States.'
send the complaint to the Judicial Conference if it believes the judge
has engaged in conduct that might constitute grounds for impeach1
ment or if the council cannot justly resolve the complaint. 1
Complainants and subjectjudges may petition thejudicial council for
review of the chief judge's action, or, if aggrieved by the council's
discretionary
action, they may petition the Judicial Conference for
32
review. Orders of the Judicial Conference are final.1
In the matter of the charges against Judge Sentelle, Judge
Edwards dismissed the complaints as not in conformity with the Act's
The complainants petitioned
substantive disciplinary standard.'
the Judicial Council of the D.C. Circuit, which endorsed the dismiss34
al.
B. The Substantive Standard of the Judicial Conduct Act

The substantive standard governing the imposition of discipline under the Judicial Conduct Act has not lent itself to easy or consistent interpretation.13 5 What constitutes "conduct prejudicial to
See § 372(c) (4).
See § 372(c)(5).
Courses of action that the council may consider include:
1 § 372(c) (6).
certifying disability; requesting voluntary retirement; ordering that no cases be
assigned to the judge for a time; private or public reprimand or censure; other
appropriate action excluding removal. See id.
'

'2

15'

See § 372(c) (7) (A).

Is'
See § 372(c) (7) (B). If there may be grounds for impeachment, the council
must also certify and transmit the record and its determination to the House of
Representatives. See § 372(c) (8).
"'2
See § 372 (c) (9)-(10).
ssSee In re Charge ofJudicial Misconduct or Disability, 39 F3d 374, 376 (Judicial
Council, D.C. Cir. 1994).
134 See supra note 32.
' SeeJeffrey N. Barr & Thomas E. Willging, DecentralizedSelf-Regulation, Accountability, and Judicial Independence Under the FederalJudicial Conduct and Disability Act of
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the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the
courts" '36 was a matter of dispute during the formulation of the Act
and has continued to be so in its application by the judicial councils.' 37 Should the standard be interpreted narrowly or broadly?
Does it cover only judicial conduct on the bench or is some conduct
off the bench also covered? Does the Act address only administrative
efficiency or does it also cover conduct that brings the judicial office
into disrepute?
In a sense, the debate over the scope of the disciplinary standard
tracks the differing views of the Special Division expressed by Chief
Justice Rehnquist in Morrison and Judge Silberman in In re Sealed
1980, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 25, 73 (1993) ("With so vague and unelaborated a standard
of misconduct, uncertainty about its contours is probably inevitable."); Burbank, supra
note 122, at 15 ("The major substantive question-the types of conduct subject to
disciplinary action-remains in large part unanswered.").
" § 872(c) (1).
117 See Burbank, supra note 34, at 322 ("The problem of evaluating complaint
dismissals is exacerbated by the Act's substantive ambiguity [and] the unavailability
to the public of dismissal orders. . . ."). There is no requirement under the Act that
a chiefjudge's dismissal order or a council's order disposing of a petition for review
be made available to the public. See § 372(c) (15) (requiring that orders issued by a
judicial council, the Judicial Conference or the standing committee be "made
available to the public through the appropriate clerk's office of the court of appeals
for the circuit"); see also Burbank, supranote 34, at 322 n.166 ("There is no requirement that either a chiefjudge's order dismissing or closing a complaint or a council's
order disposing of a petition for review be made publicly available.").
In 1986, a special committee of the Conference of Chief Judges published
nonbinding illustrative rules for the Act. See Burbank, supra note 122, at 14 (noting
that the illustrative rules "appeared at a time when federal judicial discipline [wa]s in
the news again"). Illustrative Rule 17 called for circuits to make orders public on a
national basis, apparently in an effort to create a common law under the Act. See
ILLUSTRATIVE R. GOVERNING COMPLAINTS OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT & DISABILITY 17
(1986) [hereinafter ILLUSTRATIVE RI]. After an initial response from the circuits,
however, publication has waned. See Barr & WilIging, supranote 135, at 85-88 (noting
that "little evidence of the development of a common law under the Act exists," and
that "[d]issemination of information about interpretations of the Act ... seems
notably absent").
The Judicial Conference Committee to Review Circuit Council Conduct and
Disability Orders revised the Illustrative Rules in 1991 in response to amendments to
the Judicial Conduct Act under the Judicial Discipline and Removal Reform Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. IV, 104 Stat. 5122 (1990). See Memorandum from the
Committee to Review Circuit Council Conduct and Disability Orders of the Judicial
Conference of the United States to Chief Judges, United States Courts of Appeals,
United States Court of International Trade and United States Claims Court 1 (Aug.
15, 1991) (on file with author). A newly revised version of the Rules should be
published sometime in 1996. See Letter from Jeffrey N. Barr, Assistant General
Counsel, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, to Peter M. Ryan 1 (May
7, 1996) (on file with author). Hereinafter, this Comment will make reference to the
1991 version of the Illustrative Rules.
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Case. Justice Rehnquist reasoned that the Special Division posed
no threat to the impartial adjudication of "Cases" and "Controversies"
because the Ethics Act prohibited the judges from participating in
independent counsel judicial proceedings."' 8 His focus was solely
on the Special Division's ability to affect specific adjudications.
Judge Silberman's focus was broader. Article III judge participation
in political disputes, he believed, undermined the public's confidence in an impartial judiciary. 9 Interpretations of the Judicial
Conduct Act also reflect this difference in analytical focus between
the specific case and the reputation of the judiciary.
Judge Edwards's dismissal of the complaints because Article II conduct could not have "even an indirectprejudicial effect on the administration of the business of the courts' 140 demonstrates a strict
case-specific interpretation of the Judicial Conduct Act. Although
Edwards is certainly not alone in his view of the Act's scope,' 4 1 such
a formalistic interpretation does not accurately reflect the legislative
history of the Act or the Act's application.
4
1. The Legislative History of the Disciplinary Standard

1

The legislative history of the Act's substantive standard suffers,
like the standard itself, from ambiguity. The ambiguity of the
standard derives from its brevity and generality. The ambiguity of
the legislative history, on the other hand, results from its mixture of
competing and sometimes conflicting views about the proper scope
of the disciplinary standard. Taken as a whole, though, these
mingled congressional intentions support a conception of the Act's
breadth that is larger than the "specific Article III case" interpretation.
The Senate version of what would become the Judicial Conduct
Act, S. 1873, originally contained language that would have permitted
a complaint to allege that the subject judge had engaged "'in
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice by bringing the
11 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
'39 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
" In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct or Disability, 39 F3d 374, 379 (Judicial
Council, D.C. Cir. 1994).
"4 See Barr & Willging, supra note 135, at 73 (quoting a chiefjudge's statement
that Congress "'intended to limit jurisdiction under the Act to conduct adversely
affecting judicial performance in some concrete manner'"). The notion of "effect,"
however, is somewhat elastic.
4 For a detailed description of the Act's background and legislative history, see
Burbank, supra note 34, at 291-304.
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judicial office into disrepute.'""' This phrasing of the substantive
standard, however, was deleted at the suggestion of Senator Birch
Bayh (D-Ind.), "because it was felt that this standard could be too
intrusive on the judge's personal life and was subject to possible
abuse." 1"
Senator Bayh viewed the Act as having a limited
jurisdiction: "Extrajudicial habits and behavior are outside the reach
of the bill. It is only when ajudge's behavior affects his performance
45
on the bench that a complaint is valid."1

The SenateJudiciary Committee's report on S.1873 appeared to
echo Senator Bayh's interpretation. In its statement of general
principles, the report described conduct that is "not connected with
the judicial office" or conduct that does "not affect the administration of justice" as outside the scope of the Act.'
Nevertheless, the report also approvingly cited state judicial
disciplinary models that covered a great variety of conduct not
directly related to the performance of official duties.147 The report
stated that the standards of the Act were to be given their common
usage and already existing statutory understanding:
Effective and expeditious administration of the business of the
courts is language already found in Section 332 of Title 28 and is
intended to include willful misconduct in office, willful and
persistent failure to perform the duties of the office, habitual
intemperence, and other conduct prejudicial to the administration
ofjustice that brings the judicial office into disrepute.148
14 Id. at 303 n.79 (quoting Hearingson S.295, S. 522, S.678 Before the Subcomm. on
Judicial Machinery and Constitution of the Senate Comm. on theJudiciary,96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 494 (1979)).
1
125 CONG. REC. 30,050 (1979) (statement of Sen. Thurmond).
'4 125 CONG. REC. 30,064 (1979) (statement of Sen. Bayh).
146S. REP. No. 362, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.CAN.
4315, 4317 [hereinafter SENATE REPORT].
147 See id. at 8-9.
14 Id. The particular language used in the Act was familiar to the judiciary. In
1961, the Judicial Conference approved a report on the powers and duties of the
judicial councils which stated:
The responsibility of the Councils "for the effective and expeditious
administration of the business of the courts within its circuit" extends not
merely to the business of the courts in its technical sense (Judicial
administration), such as the handling and dispatching of cases, but also to
the business of the judiciary in its institutional sense (administration of
justice), such as the avoiding of any stigma, disrepute, or other element of
loss of public esteem and confidence in respect of the court system, from the
actions of a judge or other person attached to the courts.
Burbank, supranote34, at 294 n.37 (quoting Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial
Conference of the United States 51 (Mar. 1961), reprintedin H.R. Doc. No. 201, 87th
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Describing the above terms as "terms of art" because of their usage
in state disciplinary systems, the report expressly disavowed any
attempt to add a "legislative gloss."149 Thus, despite the deletion
of the "disrepute" language from the Act's substantive standard, the
Committee intended some species of disreputable, off-the-bench
conduct to remain within the Act's scope.
The Senate Report further recommended reference to the ABA
Canons of Judicial Ethics 5 ' and the Code of Judicial Conduct for
United States Judges in evaluating complaints.'51 Canon 2A of the
Code ofJudicial Conduct states that ajudge "should conduct himself
at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary."'15 2 Though they are
merely nonbinding considerations under the Act, these ethical norms
address judicial conduct outside and inside the courtroom and
disapprove of judges engaging in partisan political activities.15
The House of Representatives committee report did not include
a detailed description of the Act's substantive standard. What little
description the report did provide supports the idea that Congress
did not intend to limit the Act's scope to conduct in specific Article
III cases. The standard was said to incorporate "complaints regarding impeachable behavior [and] violations of the criminal laws of any
State or the United States."'5 4 A strict Article III interpretation of
Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1961)). The Conference reaffirmed this proposition in 1974. See
id.
149SENATE REPORT, supranote 146, at 9.
'0 See CANONS OFJUDICIAL ETHICS (1957), superceded by MODEL CODE OFJUDICIAL
CONDUCT (1990).
'5' See SENATE REPORT, supra note 146, at 9.
152 CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2A. The complaints againstJudge Sentelle

used the "appearance of impropriety" language of Canon 2. In re Charge ofJudicial
Misconduct or Disability, 39 F.3d 374, 377 (Judicial Council, D.C. Cir. 1994).
"55See, e.g., Judicial Conference of the United States, Interim Advisory Comm. on
Judicial Activities, Advisory Op. No. 19 (1970) (stating that ajudge should resign from
a politically active club, even if the judge is not an active participant, because of the
appearance of partisan activities); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 867 (1965) (describing ajudge's attendance and placement at the
head table during a political fundraising dinner as "fraught with aspects of
impropriety"); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 312
(1964) (stating that ajudge who becomes a candidate forjudicial office should refrain
from all conduct which might "tend to arouse reasonable suspicion that he is using
the power or prestige of his judicial position to promote.., the success of his party");
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 113 (1934) ("[A]
judge is entitled to entertain his personal views of political questions, but should not
directly or indirectly participate in partisan political activities.").
154 H.R. REP. No. 1313, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1980) [hereinafter HOUSE

1996]

COUNSELS, COUNCILS AND LUNCH

2565

the scope of the Act proves too little if criminal conduct off the
bench is also covered. It is possible that this could still leave a large
gray area of noncriminal, nonjudicial behavior beyond the Act's
reach by virtue of Senator Bayh's concern for a judge's private
life. 55 The House report, however, observed that a valid complaint
under the Act could involve "an allegation that several judges have
engaged in activities demeaning to the bench; assume, for example,
that after a meeting of a circuit's judicial conference, a large number
of judges become intoxicated in a bar of ill repute."1 5 6 The report
did not specify whether the judges' activity per se-being drunk in
a bar of ill repute-brought them within the Act's scope or whether
.the determinative factor was the activity's temporal proximity to the
circuit's judicial conference.
The legislative history of the Act, while inconclusive, suggests two
things. First, most private behavior, 'judge-as-citizen" behavior, is
beyond the Act's scope. Second, the more disreputable the nonjudicial behavior, the more likely the Act will address it.'5 7 Although
the dividing line is unclear, Congress intended the Act to regulate
some non-Article III conduct which brings the judicial office into
disrepute. If the benchmark is how "official" the non-Article III
conduct appears, abuse of Article II appointment power while on the
Special Division should qualify for coverage. The panel is by statute
a division of the D.C. Circuit.'
A member of the Special Division
must be an Article IIIjudge. His duties resemble those of ajudge far
more than a private citizen.
2. The Disciplinary Standard in Practice
The paucity of published orders makes it difficult to analyze
comprehensively the judicial councils' application of the Act's
disciplinary standard.'5 9 It is possible, however, to glean some idea
of the Act in practice from the limited published orders and
scholarly commentaries.
Because the Act places enforcement
responsibility with the individual judicial councils, the application of
1 60
the disciplinary standard has been varied and often conflicting.
REPORT].
55 See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
' HoUSE REPORT, supra note 154, at 12.
157 Criminal behavior falls easily on the side of inclusion.
"See 28 U.S.C. § 49(a) (1994).
...
See supranote 137.
1'See Richard L. Marcus, Who Should DisciplineFederalJudges,and How?, 149 ER.D.
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It is perhaps unsurprising that the generality of the substantive
standard and the ambiguity of the legislative history would yield such
61

a result.1

As would be expected, the great majority of complaints and
actions under the Act have involved conduct associated with specific
Article III "Cases" or "Controversies." 162 As to conduct outside this
setting, responses are mixed. Chiefjudges and judicial councils have
dismissed complaints relating to comments byjudges in speeches and
newspapers, perjury allegedly committed prior to taking the bench,
and participation in family members' legal actions. 6
Judicial
councils have also interpreted the Act to regulate some instances of
politically partisan or highly disreputable conduct that is not directly
related to a specific Article III dispute. In such cases, the fact that
an Article III judge had allegedly committed the acts was the
touchstone; the institutional setting was not.
The First Circuit Judicial Council found a judge's speeches
endorsing statehood for Puerto Rico to be political conduct within
the scope of the Act's substantive standard."6 The Sixth Circuit
Judicial Council similarly considered valid a complaint about a
judge's public statements concerning Congress's failure to increase
'
judicial salaries. 65
Although both proceedings were eventually
375, 401-02 (1993) (noting the lack of a "common law" under the Act and the fact
that "[t] here is presently no method for resolving consciously conflicting interpretations of the Act").
"6 Shortly before the Act became effective, ChiefJudge James R. Browning of the
Ninth Circuit described what he considered to be the administrative thrust of the Act:
"The process is initiated not by alleging 'misconduct' or 'conduct that brings the
judicial office into disrepute,' but by alleging 'conduct prejudicial to the effective and
expeditious administration of the business of the courts.' Only time will determine
the significance of these differences, but their significance may be great." James R.
Browning, EvaluatingJudicialPerformanceandRelated Matters,90 FR.D. 197,204 (1981).
62 See Barr & Willging, supra note 135, at 49-50 (presenting statistical data on the
types of allegations filed).
163 See Marcus, supra note 160, at 404-07 (summarizing the complaints and
subsequent dismissals). One complaint alleged that ajudge made racist comments
in a newspaper article. Another centered on ajudge's speech in which he called for
the legalization of drug use. Yet another complaint arose in the course of a custody
dispute between ajudge's wife and her former husband. The ex-husband challenged
the judge's reluctance to advise his fiancee to obey a court order to reveal her child's
whereabouts. None of these dismissed complaints alleged partisan behavior. See id.
at 404-06. Professor Marcus, while citing these dismissals, noted that the legislative
history of the Act suggests that "behavior seemingly outside thejudicial context is not
per se immune to regulation." Id. at 404.
164 See id. at 386.
163 See id. at 387.

1996]

COUNSELS, COUNCILS AND LUNCH

2567

concluded after "appropriate corrective action,"'66 both complaints
were found to be in conformity with the Act's substantive standard.
In another complaint, the chief judge of the Sixth Circuit
concluded that a bankruptcy judge's serious indiscretions involving
abusive language and conduct toward women both in court and,
more frequently, in nearby bars and restaurants brought the federal
judiciary into disrepute. 6 7 Both the in-court and out-of-court
behavior violated Canons 1 and 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
68
and were thus subject to proceedings under the Act.
The Illustrative Rules, published in 1986 to aid the implementation of the Act, described what types of complaints the Act authorized. Among other things, the disciplinary standard under the Act
covered "use of the judge's office to obtain special treatment for
friends and relatives."169 This concept need not be stretched too
far to encompass an Article III judge's use of a power exclusively
vested in him by Congress to perform a politically partisan favor for
an old friend. Practice under the Judicial Conduct Act suggests that
a complaint about such behavior should not be dismissed outright.
C. ChiefJudge Edwards'sArticle Il/Article IIIDistinction Is
Inconsistent with the Judicial Conduct Act
The Judicial Conduct Act's legislative history and application in
other situations, although not univocal, suggest thatJudge Edwards's
formalistic distinction between Article II conduct and Article III
conduct represents a departure from the Act's purposes. 7 The
Act applies predominantly to Article III conduct; that is the primary
28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(3)(B) (1994).
167 See In re Harry G. Hackett, Unreported Findings and Report (6th Cir.June 24,

1981) reported in AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOC'Y, JUD. DISCIPLINE & DISABILITY
DIG.-PosT 1980 SUPPLEMENTS, at FED2-3 (Yvette Begue ed., Jan. 1981-June 1986
Supp.).
"6See id. Canon 1 provides: "A judge should uphold the integrity and
independence of the judiciary." Canon 2 provides: "A judge should avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities." CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canons 1, 2. Whether the Act covers nonjudicial conduct seems to be a
question of degree. See Marcus, supranote 160, at 406 (citing the Fourth Circuit Chief
Judge's dismissal of a complaint about ajudge's "rude" behavior in a dispute over a
parking space).
16 ILLUSTRATIVE R. 1(b).
1' It also conflicts with how a panel of the D.C. Circuit, in the main case
upholding the Act's constitutionality, interpreted the substantive standard of the Act.
See Hastings v. Judicial Conference, 829 F2d 91, 106 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (quoting the
Senate Report's assertion that the Act included "'conduct prejudicial to the
administration ofjustice that brings the judicial office into disrepute'").
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business of the courts. But an action's classification in the constitutional scheme is not determinative of whether it is "prejudicial to the
effective and expeditious administration of the business of the
courts." 17'
The Act covers some disreputable conduct that,
although it may have no Article III origin or relation, rises to a level
at which some prejudicial effect could occur. Applying the Act to an
allegedly political abuse of Article II appointment power by a
member of the Special Division would neither violate the purpose of
the Act nor impermissibly increase its scope.
Judge Edwards's conception would exclude from coverage under
the Act any actions performed by a judge pursuant to a grant of
power under Article I.
The Supreme Court has described
rulemaking power as originating in Article 1.172 Federal judges,
performing non-Article III duties, have contributed to the formulation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, as well as appellate and district court local
procedural rules. If presented with evidence that a federal judge had
engaged in some form of misconduct while on a rulemaking
committee, it is unlikely that a judicial council would simply dismiss
the complaint as not in conformity with the Act.
Federal judges also perform non-Article III duties when they
naturalize aliens.17 1 Were a federal judge to preface a naturalization ceremony with a racist, xenophobic diatribe against the
participants, it is likely that ajudicial council would find a complaint
about such behavior to be a valid one. Under Judge Edwards's
theory of the substantive standard, this behavior could not be the
subject of discipline.

7128 U.S.C. § 372(c)(1) (1994).
"v'
See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 386 n.14 (1989) ("[R]ulemaking
power originates in the Legislative Branch and becomes an executive function only
when delegated by the Legislature to the Executive Branch."); see also Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965) ("[T]he constitutional provision for a federal court
system[,] augmented by the Necessary and Proper Clause[,] carries with it congressional power to make rules governing the practice and pleading in those courts.... .");
Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1941) ("Congress has undoubted power to
regulate the practice and procedure of federal courts, and may exercise that power
by delegating to this or other federal courts authority to make rules not inconsistent
with the statutes or [C] onstitution of the United States .... " (footnote omitted)).
'73See8 U.S.C. §§ 1447-48 (1994); 36 U.S.C. § 154 (1994).
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D. Abuse of the Special Division Appointment Power Should Fall Within
the Ambit of the Judicial Conduct Act
Neither the legislative history nor the subsequent application of
the Judicial Conduct Act supportsJudge Edwards's formalistic Article
II/Article III distinction regarding the Act's substantive standard.
Rather, both support a substantive standard that would encompass
Judge Sentelle's behavior on the Special Division. Only Article III
judges can be members of this special panel of the D.C. Circuit.
Their activities are intimately related to potential Article III "Cases"
and "Controversies." Application of the Judicial Conduct Act to
Special Division activities would not intrude upon ajudge's personal
life, nor would it impermissibly expand the Act's scope.
Thus, there is in fact a simple solution to justice Scalia's concern
in Morrison that there would be no remedy for politically motivated
abuse of the Special Division's appointment power. 7 4 Such abuse
should fall within the disciplinary ambit of the judicial Conduct Act.
CONCLUSION

The Senate Report on the Judicial Conduct Act stated that "[t] he
perception of justice is of critical importance." 75 Despite Judge
Edwards's dismissal of the complaint against Judge Sentelle, it
remains the case that, in the eyes of many, a federal judge abused
governmental appointment power. The public saw ajudge-not an
ordinary citizen or a legislator or a member of the executive branch.
As former ABA President Robert D. Raven described it, "[the] point
is whether the vast majority of the public would believe there is an
appearance of impropriety. The distinction between Article II or
Article III is probably known by most judges and some lawyers but by
76
very few members of the public."
The perceived abuse of Special Division appointment power, left
unchecked, could undermine the public's confidence in the
neutrality of thejudiciary. A real abuse of that power could result in
prosecutorial violations of constitutional rights. The sensible
application of the judicial Conduct Act to the members of the
Special Division would provide an effective defense against both
threats.
See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 729-31 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
supra note 146, at 7.
HenryJ. Reske, Lunch Not Unethical: Judge Rules on Sentelle Complaints,A.BA J.,
Jan. 1995, at 27, 27.
175 SENATE REPORT,
'76

